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INTRODUCTION

In recent years electronic discovery has been the media darling
of legal writing, at least in the civil procedure arena. The 2006
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were directed
1
in large part to dealing with discovery of electronic information,
2
and they have generated enormous, and some would say undue,
attention to the broader subject of electronic evidence in law
3
review articles, as well as in numerous bar journals and other legal
1. See, e.g., Theodore C. Hirt, The Two-Tier Discovery Provision of Rule
26(b)(2)(B)—A Reasonable Measure for Controlling Electronic Discovery?, 13 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 12 (2007); Daniel Renwick Hodgman, A Port in the Storm?: The Problematic
and Shallow Safe Harbor for Electronic Discovery, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 259 (2007);
Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-Discovery, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (2004); Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The
December 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 171 (2006).
2. For a thoughtful article suggesting that the e-discovery crisis might be a
little overblown, see Hon. James M. Rosenbaum, The Death of E-Discovery, 54 FED.
LAW. 26 (July 2007).
3. See, e.g., Salvatore Joseph Bauccio, Comment, E-Discovery: Why and How Email Is Changing the Way Trials Are Won and Lost, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 269 (2007); John
L. Carroll, Developments in the Law of Electronic Discovery, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 357
(2003); Laura E. Ellsworth & Robert Pass, Cost Shifting in Electronic Discovery, 5
SEDONA CONF. J. 125 (2004); James M. Evangelista, Polishing the “Gold Standard” on
the E-Discovery Cost-Shifting Analysis: Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 9 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 1 (2004); Philip J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and
Obtaining Metadata, 13 B.U.J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2007); Corinne L. Giacobbe, Note,
Allocating Discovery Costs in the Computer Age: Deciding Who Should Bear the Costs of
Discovery of Electronically Stored Data, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257 (2000); Kindall C.
James, Electronic Discovery: Substantially Increasing the Risk of Inadvertent Disclosure and
the Costs of Privilege Review—Do the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Help?, 52 LOY. L. REV. 839 (2006); Lynn Jokela, Comment: Electronic
Discovery Disputes: Will the Eighth Circuit Courts Move Beyond Ad-Hoc Decision Making?,
30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1031 (2004); Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic Discovery, NAT’L
L.J., Nov. 24, 2003, at 30; Virginia Llewellyn, Electronic Discovery Best Practices, 10
RICH. J.L. & TECH. 51 (2004); Richard L. Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward
Brave New World or 1984?, 236 F.R.D. 598 (2006); Richard H. Middleton, The
“Complexities” of Electronic Discovery, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 105 (2004); Andrew Moerke
Mason, Throwing Out the (Electronic) Trash: True Deletion Would Soothe E-Discovery
Woes, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 777 (2006); Michael R. Nelson & Mark H.
Rosenberg, A Duty Everlasting: The Perils of Applying Traditional Doctrines of Spoliation
to Electronic Discovery, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14 (2006); Rebecca Rockwood,
Comment, Shifting Burdens and Concealing Electronic Evidence: Discovery in the Digital
Era, 12 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 16 (2006); Lee H. Rosenthal, A Few Thoughts on Electronic
Discovery After December 1, 2006, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 167 (2006); Hon. Shira
A. Scheindlin & Jeffrey Rabkin, Electronic Discovery in Federal Civil Litigation: Is Rule
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publications. Entire treatises have been written on the subject,
and a law school casebook focused on electronic discovery has even
6
appeared. Prominent websites are devoted to “e-discovery,” as the
7
subject has become known. Even before the 2006 amendments to
the federal rules, the Federal Judicial Center’s Manual for Complex
Litigation recommended that any discovery plan address discovery
8
of electronic information. The federal rules now expressly allow
9
judges to require it.
Comparatively little has been written on the myriad issues
relating to how electronic evidence, once discovered, is treated
10
when it is offered as proof. Less still is written on how the issues
11
are handled under Minnesota law.
This article addresses the evidence issues presented by
electronic evidence, and suggests how these issues should be
addressed under Minnesota evidence law. We specifically do not
34 Up to the Task?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 327 (2000); Bahar Shariati, Note, Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg: Evidence that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Provide the Means for
Determining Cost Allocation in Electronic Discovery Disputes?, 49 VILL. L. REV. 393
(2004); Withers, supra note 1. Not all of the literature on electronic discovery was
written in the twenty-first century. Many of the issues have been recognized for
decades. See, e.g., Richard M. Long, Comment, The Discovery and Use of Computerized
Information: An Examination of Current Approaches, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 405 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Michael C. McCarthy, Thinking Outside the Box: Recent Developments
in Electronic Discovery, 61 BENCH & B. MINN., Dec. 2004, at 17; Kerry A. Brennan &
Mia R. Martin, Threshold Decisions on Electronic Discovery, 76 N.Y. ST. B.J., Nov./Dec.
2004, at 23; Stuart Miller & Stephanie Irby Randall, A Primer on Electronic Discovery
for the General Practitioner, 39 ARK. LAW., Fall 2004, at 16.
5. See, e.g., RONALD J. HEDGES, DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED
INFORMATION (2007); ADAM I. COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER, ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY:
LAW AND PRACTICE (2003).
6. SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND DIGITAL EVIDENCE:
CASES AND MATERIALS (2008).
7. See, e.g., www.ediscoverylaw.com, a particularly helpful site maintained by
the Seattle law firm K&L Gates, LLP.
8. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 11.446 (J. Stanley Marcus et al.
eds., 4th ed. 2004).
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
10. “Early” articles addressing these issues include Andrew Jablon, Note, “God
Mail”: Authentication and Admissibility of Electronic Mail in Federal Courts, 34 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 1387 (1997); Anthony J. Dreyer, When the Postman Beeps Twice: The
Admissibility of Electronic Mail Under the Business Records Exception of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2285 (1996); Christine A. Guilshan, Note, A Picture Is
Worth a Thousand Lies: Electronic Imaging and the Future of the Admissibility of
Photographs Into Evidence, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 365 (1992).
11. For one available source, see 11 PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA
PRACTICE: EVIDENCE (3d ed. 2001) (addressing e-discovery in the context of
individual rules of evidence and specific case decisions).
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intend to contribute to the literature devoted to discovering
electronic information.
We address the questions of how
electronic evidence—whether a party’s own information,
information obtained by investigation, or obtained from parties or
12
non-parties in formal discovery—can be used in trial proceedings.
We conclude that the Minnesota law of evidence is well equipped
to deal with admissibility issues relating to electronic evidence.
Indeed, it has been doing so successfully for decades.
II. THE UBIQUITY OF ELECTRONIC INFORMATION
If there is one thing every commentator agrees on it is that
most information, at least at some point in its life, is stored in
electronic form. Many documents or records exist only in
electronic form. Experts can only estimate just how large the
13
margin of electronic form of documents is, but there is no room
to dispute that the majority of the evidence in many cases and
virtually all of it in some cases, is created or used in electronic form.
The ubiquity of electronic evidence is not a “big case” issue,
nor is it a “corporate” issue. Discovery of electronic evidence can
be encountered in virtually every type of case—personal injury,
medical malpractice, marriage dissolution, trust litigation, and
every other case type imaginable. Phone records, cell phone
12. “At trial” is really shorthand for any stage of the proceedings where
admissibility will be assessed. Evidence used in motion practice must be admissible
as well. See, e.g., In re Minn. Asbestos Litigation, 552 N.W.2d 242 (Minn. 1996)
(holding that exhibits were not authenticated where supported only by conclusory
affidavits of counsel); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)
(recognizing that for summary judgment, a court may only consider evidence that
is admissible). See generally 11A PETER N. THOMPSON & DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA
PRACTICE: COURTROOM HANDBOOK OF MINNESOTA EVIDENCE 487 (West 2009), where
the authors state:
The most important rule to remember is that motions are decided on
competent evidence. As a general rule, if evidence would not be
admissible at a trial, it should not be probative in a motion hearing. As at
trial, where evidence is expressly “offered” into evidence, evidence on a
motion should be identified and made part of the record for the motion.
See generally THE SEDONA CONFERENCE COMMENTARY ON ESI EVIDENCE AND
ADMISSIBILITY 2 (2008) (noting that summary judgment is the stage in the
proceedings where e-evidentiary hurdles are most likely to be encountered).
13. At the Sedona Conference, it was estimated that in 2006, “we created,
captured and replicated enough digital information to fill all of the books ever
created in the world, 3 million times.” Id. at 17. By 2011, however, it is estimated
that this “digital universe will be 10 times the size it was in 2006.” IDC White
Paper, The Diverse and Exploding Digital Universe: An Updated Forecast of Worldwide
Information Growth Through 2011, at 2 (2008).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/2

4

Sugisaka and Herr: Admissibility of E-evidence in Minnesota: New Problems or Evidenc

2009]

ADMISSIBILITY OF E-EVIDENCE

1457

registers, personal computer information, photographs taken on
digital cameras—all can be important evidence in these cases, and
many of these “documents” are important in every type of litigated
case. E-mail is even more uniformly understood to be encountered
and potentially important in every type of case.
III. STANDARDS RELATING TO ADMISSIBILITY OF
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION
A. Basic Evidentiary Status of Electronic Evidence
There is no intrinsic barrier in the law of evidence to the
admissibility of electronic evidence. For example, e-mail may be
admissible, but it also may be excluded from evidence even though
14
relevant to the issues. In general, however, decisions excluding email from evidence do so for reasons other than the intrinsic
nature of its electronic form—the evidence may not be relevant, or
its receipt in evidence may have unfair prejudicial value that
exceeds its probative value, or it may contain hearsay, etc. As e-mail
has become a pervasive part of decisions, exclusion of e-mails from
evidence merely because they are e-mails is a feature of decisions
15
from the last century.
It is axiomatic that the discovery of information does not give
rise to any presumption that it will be admissible at trial. Indeed,
just the opposite is so: clearly inadmissible information may well be
discoverable.
To be discoverable under the rules of civil
procedure, information need only be admissible or “reasonably
16
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”
B. Issues Relating to Electronic Evidence
The leading case dealing generally with the issues surrounding
14. Compare Strauss v. Microsoft Corp., No. 91 Civ. 5928, 1995 WL 326492, at
*4–5 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1995) (denying motion in limine to exclude e-mail), with
Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 449 (9th Cir. 1994)
(holding that e-mail messages are not business records and thus inadmissible
hearsay).
15. See, e.g., Monotype Corp. PLC, 43 F.3d at 449 (refusing to recognize e-mail
messages as business records).
16. See MINN. R. CIV. P. 26.02(a); Ramsey County v. S. M. F., 298 N.W.2d 40
(Minn. 1980). The federal counterpart to this portion of Rule 26.02(a) is
identical. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). Evidence may be discoverable even if only
potentially useful for impeachment. See, e.g., Boldt v. Sanders, 261 Minn. 160, 111
N.W.2d 225 (1961).
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admissibility of electronic evidence is Lorraine v. Markel American
17
Insurance Company. It is a leading case not because it is the first—
electronic evidence has been considered in various forms for
years—it is a leading case because it comprehensively and
thoughtfully addresses many of the issues. The court in Lorraine
stated that five evidentiary questions relate to the admission of
electronic evidence before it can be found to be admissible:
whether the evidence is (1) relevant, (2) authentic, (3) not hearsay
or admissible hearsay, (4) the “best evidence,” and (5) not unduly
18
prejudicial. In addition to addressing these legal requirements,
Lorraine is useful precedent because it deals separately with
19
numerous categories of evidence that appear in electronic form.
20
21
Specifically, the court considered e-mail, Internet web postings,
22
text messages and chat room content, computer-stored records
23
24
and data, computer animations and computer simulations, and
25
Each of the five evidentiary questions
digital photographs.
addressed in Lorraine has a well-recognized place in the existing law
of evidence in Minnesota.
1.

Relevance
26

All evidence must be relevant in order to be admissible. In
that respect, there can be nothing unique to electronic evidence on
this front. Relevance is not a unique feature of the evidence itself,
but rather, essentially a judgment about its connection to the issues
in the case. Evidence is relevant if it “logically tends to prove or
27
disprove a material fact in issue.” It is hard to think of a piece of
evidence that would be relevant in electronic form but not relevant
in paper or some other format.
2.

Authenticity

Authenticity is a simple prerequisite to master.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

This

241 F.R.D. 534 (D. Md. 2007).
Id. at 538.
Id. at 554–62.
Id. at 554–55.
Id. at 555–56.
Id. at 556.
Id. at 556–59.
Id. at 559–61.
Id. at 561–62.
MINN. R. EVID. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”).
Boland v. Morrill, 270 Minn. 86, 99, 132 N.W.2d 711, 719 (1965).
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requirement simply asks: “Is this evidence what it purports to be?”
Authenticity is often the central battleground for determining
admissibility of electronic evidence, as electronic records may be
readily altered and made to appear to be something they are not.
It is not at all difficult to create a document that looks like an e29
mail sent by one of the parties to the case. As we all know from
the spam in our inboxes, it is also possible to create an actual e-mail
message sent from a purported author who has never seen, sent, or
30
authorized it.
31
This was also true in the era of typewriters and carbon paper,
when parties would occasionally seek to create a document out of
32
whole cloth or fabricate some detail, such as backdating it. Aside
33
from potentially subjecting its creator to sanctions, the document
would not be authentic and therefore not admissible (except
possibly in a prosecution of the fabricator). Medical records have
long been targets of individuals or organizations seeking to rewrite
34
or at least “polish up” history. Medical records are increasingly
found only in electronic form; most medical record systems have,
or should have, specific mechanisms to permit the record
custodian to verify when an entry was made, by whom, and that it
hasn’t been altered.
28. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 901(a); MINN. R. EVID. 901(a).
29. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Madison Area Technical Coll., 321 F.3d 652, 653–54
(7th Cir. 2003) (involving falsified letters and e-mails in an employment
discrimination suit).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Kilbride, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1055 (D. Ariz.
2007) (discussing the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and
Marketing Act of 2003, aimed at preventing spam senders from deceiving
intended recipients as to the source or subject matter of the e-mail messages); see
also Joseph F. Cella III & John Reed Stark, SEC Enforcement and the Internet: Meeting
the Challenge of the Next Millennium, 52 BUS. LAW. 815, 826 (1997) (detailing what is
known as “spoofing,” which is the altering or falsifying of e-mails to impersonate a
real person or user ID of a real person).
31. “Carbon paper n. A lightweight paper coated on one side with a dark
waxy pigment, placed between two sheets of blank paper so that the bottom sheet
will receive a copy of what is typed or written on the top sheet.” THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 280 (4th ed. 2000). Carbon
paper was widely used before photocopiers came into widespread use.
32. See, e.g., Herbert L. Packer, A Tale of Two Typewriters, 10 STAN. L. REV. 409,
420–21 (1958) (analyzing a typewritten forgery).
33. See, e.g., Derzack v. County of Allegheny, 173 F.R.D. 400, 403 (W.D. Pa.
1996) (imposing dismissal as sanction for fabricating evidence).
34. See, e.g., Pisel v. Stamford Hosp., 430 A.2d 1, 15 (Conn. 1980) (examining
the substitution of a falsified document in a patient chart after adverse incident).
See generally Stanford M. Gage, Alteration, Falsification, and Fabrication on Records in
Medical Malpractice Actions, 27 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 476 (1981).
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Hearsay

To some degree, most electronic evidence presents a hearsay
question. Hearsay is defined to be a statement, other than one
made by the witness in court, offered to prove the truth of the
35
36
matter. Hearsay is generally not admissible in evidence, though
37
the exceptions to that rule are abundant.
The rules include dozens of specific exceptions to the general
38
rule that hearsay is inadmissible. Rule 803 identifies twenty-three
categories of hearsay that may still be admissible, without regard to
39
whether the person who made the statement is available to testify.
Rule 804 identifies additional exceptions applicable only when the
40
declarant is not available to testify.
4.

“Original Writing”

The “original writing” rule is one of the more perplexing rules
of evidence. The rule is made more opaque by its misleading
sobriquet, the “best evidence” rule. Set forth in Minnesota Rules of
Evidence 1002, the rule is simple in text: “To prove the content of a
writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording,
or photograph is required, except as otherwise provided in these
41
rules or by Legislative Act.” As is true for hearsay, the “except”
clause is as important as the rule because duplicates are routinely
42
admissible instead of the original. Rule 1004 provides the means
of admissibility when an original is not available, Rule 1005
provides special rules for “public records,” and Rule 1006 allows for
receipt of summaries in lieu of voluminous underlying evidence.
The electronic environment does require analysis of how this
requirement is met, and there is not always an obvious parallel to
how it is met for paper records.

35. See MINN. R. EVID. 801. The statement can be an oral or written assertion,
or it can be non-verbal conduct intended to be an assertion. Id. at 801(a).
36. See MINN. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by
these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court or by the
Legislature.”).
37. See MINN. R. EVID. 803(2)–(23) (listing the exceptions).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. MINN. R. EVID. 804(b).
41. MINN. R. EVID. 1002.
42. See MINN. R. EVID. 1003 (“A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as
an original . . . .”).
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Absence of Undue Prejudice (Rule 403)

Rule 403 provides that even relevant evidence may be
excluded from admission. Although the rule is a relevance rule, it
operates to override the general rule that relevant evidence will be
43
admissible. Rule 403 frequently presents challenges for electronic
evidence, particularly for documents created by computers, such as
44
animations and other illustrative exhibits.
The five-factor test developed in Lorraine is similar in result
and somewhat more readily applied than an eleven-factor test
advocated in In re Vinhnee, an earlier bankruptcy appellate
45
Vinhnee’s more arduous eleven-factor test should be
decision.
borne in mind, however, as it does overcome the potential
shortcomings inherent in Lorraine’s more cursory analysis of
potential admissibility issues. Prudent counsel should be prepared
to address any of the eleven Vinhnee factors.

43. Specifically, this important rule provides: “Although relevant, evidence
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.” MINN. R. EVID. 403.
44. See generally Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 559–560 (D.
Md. 2007) (discussing the unique authentication issues with computer animation
and simulation).
45. See In re Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446–47 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). The
court’s eleven-factor test for whether adequate foundation for receipt of electronic
evidence was adapted from EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATIONS §
4.03[2] (5th ed. 2002), and requires that the proponent of electronic evidence
establish that:
1. The business uses a computer.
2. The computer is reliable.
3. The business has developed a procedure for inserting data into the
computer.
4. The procedure has built-in safeguards to ensure accuracy and identify
errors.
5. The business keeps the computer in a good state of repair.
6. The witness had the computer readout certain data.
7. The witness used the proper procedures to obtain the readout.
8. The computer was in working order at the time the witness obtained
the readout.
9. The witness recognizes the exhibit as the readout.
10. The witness explains how he or she recognizes the readout.
11. If the readout contains strange symbols or terms, the witness explains
the meaning of the symbols or terms for the trier of fact.
(citation omitted).
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IV. OVERVIEW OF MINNESOTA EVIDENCE LAW
Minnesota’s evidence law reposes primarily in the Minnesota
46
Rules of Evidence. The rules were adopted in 1977 and were
modeled on the Federal Rules of Evidence. The major part of
evidence law not appearing in the rules is the law of privilege,
47
which remains primarily statutory in Minnesota. The Minnesota
judiciary has continued to defer to the legislature’s policy
judgments on questions of privilege, such as the privilege against
48
adverse spousal testimony.
A. Importance of Federal Evidence Law
The Minnesota Rules of Evidence were substantially identical
49
to their federal counterparts at the time of their adoption, and
they continue to be either identical or substantially the same. The
status of the rules directly relating to electronic discovery,
corresponding generally to the five issues identified in Lorraine, are
set forth in the following table:

46. See PETER N. THOMPSON, 11 MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 101.01 (3d
ed. 2001) (discussing the overview and history of the Minnesota Rules of
Evidence).
47. See MINN. R. EVID. 501 (“Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to
modify, or supersede existing law relating to the privilege of a witness, person,
government, state or political subdivision.”).
48. See State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d 409, 420 (Minn. 2002) (stating the
preference to “defer a policy determination of this nature to the legislature”).
49. See THOMPSON, supra note 46, § 101.01.
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Minnesota Evidence Rule
Rule 402—Relevance
Rule 901—Authentication and
Identification
Rule 902—Self-Authentication

50

Rule 801—Hearsay Definitions

Rule 802—Hearsay Rule
Rule 803—Hearsay Exceptions where
availability of declarant is immaterial

Rule 804—Hearsay Exceptions where
declarant is not available
Rules 1001 to 1008—Contents of
Writings (also known as “Original
Writings Rule” or, less helpfully, the
“Best Evidence Rule”)
Rule 403—Relevant evidence may be
excluded if probative value
outweighed by unfair prejudice or
confusion

1463

Federal Counterpart
Substantially identical
Identical
Substantially identical,
although Minnesota has not
adopted Rules 902(11) and
(12) relating to certification
of business records to
facilitate authentication
Rules 801(a)–(c) are
identical; Rule 801(d) (prior
statements) is substantially
different
Substantially identical
Many subdivisions are
identical; business records
exception (Rule 803(6) uses
different language but is
substantially the equivalent)
Many subdivisions are
identical; rules are
substantially similar in
purpose and interpretation
Each rule is identical

Identical

The similarity of the rules is important to Minnesota evidence
law, for where state and federal rules are substantially similar, the
Minnesota courts expressly favor using federal precedent to guide
51
Minnesota case decision-making. The federal cases are especially
50. The comparisons in this table are drawn from 11A PETER N. THOMPSON &
DAVID F. HERR, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: COURTROOM HANDBOOK OF MINNESOTA
EVIDENCE (West 2008) (comparing each state and federal rule in Chapter 1:
Minnesota Rules of Evidence with Commentary).
51. The Minnesota Supreme Court has regularly recognized the value in state
court practice of federal court interpretations of the federal rules. See, e.g.,
Patterson v. Wu Family Corp., 608 N.W.2d 863, 867 n.4 (Minn. 2000) (“Where our
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valuable because many important procedural and evidentiary
questions are infrequently encountered and are likely not to have
been addressed by the Minnesota Supreme Court. The federal
decisions therefore provide the only useful decisions to guide
Minnesota courts.
B. What Does Rule 901 Require for Authentication?
Authentication, while traditionally not presented as one of the
more problematic evidence issues, remains a prerequisite for the
52
The concept of
potential admission of any piece of evidence.
authentication itself is at once both straightforward and lacking in
53
As Rule 901(a) states, authentication is
precise parameters.
simply accomplished with “evidence sufficient to support a finding
54
In
that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.”
other words, the proponent of the evidence need only make a
prima facie showing that the evidence is what the proponent claims
it to be. This is not a particularly high threshold since the court
need not find that the evidence is what it claims to be; there only
55
need be sufficient evidence for a jury to reach such a conclusion.

rules of procedure parallel the federal rules, ‘federal cases interpreting the federal
rule are helpful and instructive but not necessarily controlling’ on our
interpretation of the state counterpart.” (quoting Johnson v. Soo Line R.R. Co.,
463 N.W.2d 894, 899 n.7 (Minn. 1990))). See also State v. Deal, 740 N.W.2d 755,
761 (Minn. 2007).
52. See MINN. R. EVID. 901(a) (identifying “authentication or identification as
a condition precedent to admissibility”); see also id. committee’s cmt. (1977) (“The
general rule treats authentication in terms of a condition precedent to
admissibility.”). Under MINN. R. EVID. 104(a) and 104(b), it is the court and not
the fact-finder that makes the admissibility determination. Rule 104(a) governs
admissibility matters concerning whether an expert is qualified and if the expert’s
opinions are admissible, the applicability of any privileges, whether evidence is
hearsay, and if any exception applies. See MINN. R. EVID. 104(a). Rule 104(b)
simply addresses whether the evidence has sufficient probative value for a
reasonable jury to find that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be. See
MINN. R. EVID. 104(b) committee’s cmt. (1977). In doing so, the fact-finder makes
the final determination of whether the evidence is authentic. Id.
53. MINN. R. EVID. 901(a) committee’s cmt. (1977) (“The concept is
frequently easy in application but most difficult to define.”).
54. MINN. R. EVID. 901(a).
55. PETER N. THOMPSON & DAVID F. HERR, 11A MINNESOTA PRACTICE:
COURTROOM HANDBOOK OF MINNESOTA EVIDENCE 272 (West 2008).
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C. How Have Minnesota Courts Historically Treated Authentication
Issues?
With this standard in mind, Minnesota appellate courts
generally have not mandated specific requirements for proper
56
authentication.
As noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
1927 in Lundgren v. Union Indemnity Co.:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to formulate a standard of
admissibility at once definite and dependable. But it
occurs to us that any relevant writing may be admitted
when from its contents and other circumstances in
evidence it is reasonably inferable that the author is the
person sought to be charged or another lawfully acting for
him. “Evidence which, if uncontradicted, would satisfy a
57
reasonable mind” is sufficient.
Thus, as a result of the common law and the general standard
under Rule 901(a), Minnesota courts have experienced little
difficulty in deciding authentication issues for a variety of
58
documentary and tangible evidence such as telegrams, business
59
60
61
62
63
records, letters, photographs, videotapes, audiotapes, public
56. PETER N. THOMPSON, 11 MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE § 901.01 (3d ed.
2001) (“Very few appellate decisions set out specific rules to be applied by the trial
judge in making rulings on authentication and identification.”). But see Furlev
Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. N. Am. Auto. Warehouse, Inc., 325 N.W.2d 20, 27 n.9
(Minn. 1982) (describing a seven-step process for authenticating audiotapes).
57. 171 Minn. 122, 125, 213 N.W. 553, 555 (1927).
58. See, e.g., id. at 126–27, 213 N.W. at 555 (holding that a telegram is not
authenticated when there is no evidence offered to support authentication);
Halstead v. Minn. Tribune Co., 147 Minn. 294, 297–98, 180 N.W. 556, 557–58
(1920) (explaining that subsequent correspondence, conduct, and
acknowledgment of receipt successfully authenticated the telegram).
59. See, e.g., Lund v. Vill. of Princeton, 250 Minn. 472, 484, 85 N.W.2d 197,
206 (1957) (authenticating business records and noting that “it is not required
that every person who took part in the compilations of business records should
testify as to their accuracy”); Watson v. Gardner, 183 Minn. 233, 234, 236 N.W.
213, 214 (1931) (receiving bank and mortgage company books and records into
evidence); Johnson v. Burmeister, 182 Minn. 385, 386–87, 234 N.W. 590, 590–91
(1931) (allowing corporate minutes to be authenticated by corporation’s former
auditor and director); State v. Johnson, 179 Minn. 217, 221, 228 N.W. 926, 927–28
(1930) (affirming the admittance of bank books and records); State v. Thornton,
174 Minn. 323, 326, 219 N.W. 176, 177 (1928) (affirming the admittance of bank
books and records). Unlike the federal rules, the Minnesota Rules of Evidence do
not provide for a specific authentication rule for business records. Compare FED. R.
EVID. 902(11) (providing for the authentication of business records), with MINN. R.
EVID. 902 (providing rules for other self-authenticating documents). The
authentication requirement for business records in Minnesota is instead found in
Rule 803(6) as a hearsay exception. See MINN. R. EVID. 803(6).
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records,
and other types of documentary information.
Circumstantial evidence of authentication will commonly suffice
when a document’s accuracy is in question because the Minnesota
60. See, e.g., State v. Pippitt, 645 N.W.2d 87, 95 (Minn. 2002) (explaining that
a letter was not authenticated when the witness denied writing the letter and no
other evidence was offered to authenticate it).
61. See, e.g., State v. Daniels, 361 N.W.2d 819, 828 (Minn. 1985) (explaining
that there was no authentication of photographs of a crime scene taken fourteen
months after event); LaCombe v. Minneapolis St. Ry. Co., 236 Minn. 86, 93, 51
N.W.2d 839, 844 (1952) (admitting photographs as authenticated after “ample
testimony” was offered, establishing that the photos “accurately depicted
conditions which were the same as those prevailing at the time of the accident”).
The “conventional method for authenticating photos is referred to as the
‘pictorial witness theory’ because the photograph is thought to be a pictorial
representation of what the witness observed.” In re Welfare of S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d
162, 164 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
62. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 721–22 (Minn. 2007) (allowing a
digitized copy of a VHS videotape to be authenticated by establishing chain of
custody and description of process for digitizing tape); State v. Williams, 337
N.W.2d 689, 690–91 (Minn. 1983) (involving authentication by a video recorder
operator who observed events depicted on videotape); S.A.M., 570 N.W.2d at 166
(authenticating videotape by testimony describing the reliability of the process or
system that created the tape, as well as by testimony from an observer that
videotape accurately portrayed the event); Scott v. State, 390 N.W.2d 889, 892–93
(Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing authentication by a witness who observed events
depicted on videotape and technician who produced the tape and did not alter it).
63. See, e.g., Furlev Sales & Assocs., Inc. v. N. Am. Auto. Warehouse, Inc., 325
N.W.2d 20, 27 n.9 (Minn. 1982) (describing a seven-step process for
authenticating audiotapes); see also Turnage v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn.
2006) (allowing a digital database of phone calls at a workhouse to be
authenticated using Furlev elements); State v. Washington, 725 N.W.2d 125, 136–
37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006) (authenticating a 911 tape based on police testimony);
In re Gonzalez, 456 N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (involving an
answering machine recording that was authenticated by a witness who identified
the voice on a recording).
64. See, e.g., Hennepin County v. Shasky, 289 Minn. 44, 49–50, 182 N.W.2d
431, 435 (1970) (allowing authentication of a map by an expert familiar with the
property on the map); State v. Northway, 588 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999) (holding that a price report was not authenticated under MINN. R. EVID.
901(b)(7), 902 or MINN. STAT. § 600.13 (2008) when no evidence substantiated
that the price report came from the U.S. Department of Agriculture; the price
report did not contain a seal, certification, authorized signature, or other such
marking; and no evidence or authority indicated it was an official publication
under MINN. R. EVID. 902(5)).
65. See, e.g., Gopher Oil Co. v. Am. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 588 N.W.2d 756,
765 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999) (involving an insurance declaration and endorsement
authenticated under MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(1)); Minneapolis Pub. Hous. Auth. v.
Greene, 463 N.W.2d 558, 561 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing a chemist’s report
to be authenticated by a chemist’s certification on the report and by chain of
custody testimony by the police officer who provided the tested substance to the
chemist).
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Supreme Court has long recognized relevant circumstantial
66
evidence as bearing on authentication. For example, in State v.
Johnson, where the issue involved whether entries in a bank’s
general ledger had been falsified, an examination of the ledger
records of a separate bank in which the bank kept a deposit
account satisfied the court that the general ledger records were
67
authentic. The proponent of the evidence did not present any
direct testimony that the signatures on the bank’s remittance
documents to the deposit bank were signatures of bank officers;
instead, comparison of the documents to an “untainted” third
68
party—the depository bank—demonstrated their authenticity.
The Minnesota Supreme Court was satisfied by evidence showing
that the two banks engaged in regular, daily transactions for
remittances, and withdrawals from which a comparison could be
made for the accuracy of the bank’s records and identification of
69
the falsified entries.
This application of circumstantial evidence to establish
authentication will continue to play an important role for
electronically stored information (“ESI”). Given the wide range of
forms ESI can take, the heightened potential for its intentional or
unintentional manipulation, and the relative impossibility of
eliminating all possibility of such manipulation, circumstantial
evidence may be a party’s best and perhaps only method to satisfy
authentication requirements.
D. Authentication Issues Raised by ESI
Although satisfying authentication requirements provides a
sufficient basis for finding that evidence is what it purports to be,
authentication is not intended or presumed to be completely
70
At best, authentication requirements simply present
foolproof.
66. See Lundgren v. Union Indem. Co., 171 Minn. 122, 125, 213 N.W. 553,
555 (1927) (“Upon the preliminary issue of admissibility, any evidence which
promises relevancy should be received, at least tentatively, for decision will
frequently depend upon many circumstances, some of which if isolatedly
considered would seem irrelevant.”).
67. 179 Minn. 217, 218–20, 228 N.W. 926, 927 (1930).
68. Id. at 220, 228 N.W. at 927.
69. Id. See also Katzmarek v. Weber Brokerage Co., 214 Minn. 580, 583, 8
N.W.2d 822, 824 (1943) (allowing admission of telephone call when identity of
person called could be “established with reasonable certainty by means of the
surrounding facts and circumstances”).
70. In order to authenticate evidence, a proponent need not negate “all
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obstacles to mistakes or manipulation. While the opportunity for
mistake or manipulation is heightened when ESI is involved, the
requirements for authenticating ESI have not necessarily been
71
To date, no
heightened by Minnesota courts in response.
Minnesota state court decisions have specifically addressed
authentication of ESI or any requirements for ESI beyond that
72
The
specified by Minnesota Rule of Evidence 901(a) or 902.
absence of additional guidance may be alarming to some given that
electronic evidence may involve issues of improper entry, retrieval,
conversion, or storage of data that can compromise the data’s
73
integrity. Although the potential for inaccuracy or manipulation
exists on a larger scale than for paper records, these problems are
not necessarily unique to ESI. In fact, the authentication of ESI
need not necessarily be more time consuming, expensive, or
problematic than the authentication of traditional writings or
possibility of tampering or substitution.” State v. Johnson, 307 Minn. 501, 505, 239
N.W.2d 239, 242 (1976). “Contrary speculation may well affect the weight of the
evidence . . . but does not affect its admissibility.” Id.
71. Elsewhere, courts and commentators have been critical of the accuracy of
ESI and call for more stringent showings of authentication. See generally United
States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir. 1977) (noting that “the complex
nature of computer storage calls for a more comprehensive foundation[,]” but
admitting a printout of compiled electronic data as a business record); Rudolph J.
Peritz, Computer Data and Reliability: A Call for Authentication of Business Records Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 956 (1986).
72. This is true even though Minnesota courts have recognized the potential
for inaccuracy in digital evidence. See State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 723 (Minn.
2007) (recognizing that “[d]espite the requirement that the duplicate be
produced by a technique designed to accurately reproduce the original, we
understand that there is the risk of manipulation or distortion, particularly with
digitization, and ‘commentators have properly urged courts to exercise greater
care for photographic evidence.’”) (quoting CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 9:23, at 509 (3d ed. 2007)).
Other
commentators have noted that “[n]o additional authenticating evidence is
required just because the records are in computerized form rather than pen or
pencil and paper.” 5 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S
FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 901.08[1] (2d ed. 2009); see also United States v. Koontz, 143
F.3d 408, 412 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding “no reason” to reject a booking report
“simply because it was computer-generated”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004) (“In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to
computerized data as they do to other types of evidence.”).
73. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446 (2004)
(“Accuracy may be impaired by incomplete data entry, mistakes in output
instructions, programming errors, damage and contamination of storage media,
power outages, and equipment malfunctions. The integrity of data may also be
compromised in the course of discovery by improper search and retrieval
techniques, data conversion, or mishandling.”).
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74

evidence.
Nonetheless, Minnesota evidence law has recognized the need
to address issues involving potential manipulation of evidence. In
Furlev Sales & Associates, Inc. v. North American Automotive Warehouse,
Inc., the Minnesota Supreme Court set forth seven foundational
elements for admission of a tape recording:
(1) a showing that the recording device was capable of
taking testimony; (2) a showing that the operator of the
device was competent; (3) establishment of the
authenticity and correctness of the recording; (4) a
showing that changes, additions and deletions have not
been made; (5) a showing of the manner of the
preservation of the recording; (6) identification of the
speakers; and (7) a showing that the testimony elicited was
75
voluntarily made without any kind of inducement.
While the Furlev requirements have not always been followed
76
for admitting tape recordings, several of these factors have the
potential to apply to ESI. The requirements of establishing that the
data is authentic and correct and that “changes, additions and
deletions have not been made” is a challenge for all forms of ESI
given the ease in which it can be altered. In addition, the
competency of a recording device and its operator has potential
77
application to computer-stored or computer-processed data.
In addition, establishing chain of custody may come into play
for ESI. This is a traditional method of demonstrating, through
testimony or evidence establishing the continuous whereabouts of
the item at issue, that evidence has not been contaminated or
78
altered. Indeed, chain of custody has been an essential element
for many forms of physical evidence that are not otherwise unique
74. Indeed, the greater time and expense involved in satisfying “fail-safe”
standards for authenticating ESI likely outweighs the likelihood of the existence of
mistake or fraud.
75. 325 N.W.2d 20, 27 n.9 (Minn. 1982). In Furlev, the tape recording at issue
was admitted without meeting these seven foundational requirements but the
court determined that such error was harmless. Id. at 27–28.
76. Compare Turnage v. State, 708 N.W.2d 535, 542 (Minn. 2006) (finding
digital database of phone calls at workhouse authenticated under Furlev elements)
with State v. Washington, 725 N.W.2d 125, 136–37 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
(authenticating 911 tape based on police testimony) and In re Gonzalez, 456
N.W.2d 724, 728 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (allowing authentication of answering
machine recording by witness who identified the voice on a recording).
77. These requirements are more fully discussed infra with regard to MINN. R.
EVID. 901(b)(9) addressing authentication of a process or system.
78. See State v. Johnson, 307 Minn. 501, 504, 239 N.W.2d 239, 242 (1976).
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and inherently identifiable by their appearance.
Establishing
chain of custody does not require eliminating all possibility of
80
alteration or manipulation. But “the more susceptible the item is
to alteration, substitution, or change of condition, the greater the
81
need to negate such possibilities.” This is particularly true of ESI
given that it can exist in multiple locations with varying degrees of
access and can be readily altered.
E. Rule 901 Authentication Methods for ESI
Rule 901(b) provides ten non-exhaustive illustrations of
authentication methods, including direct testimony, circumstantial
evidence, and proof of custody. The following authentication
methods would most commonly apply to different types of ESI:
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony that a
82
matter is what it is claimed to be.
The simplest and most common form of direct proof to
authenticate is the production of a witness with personal
knowledge who testifies that the item is what it purports to be,
whether through authorship, source, substance, accuracy, or
otherwise.
The witness may authenticate the document by
demonstrating proof of authorship or other connection, including
83
by witnessing authorship or receipt of the document. This rule
encompasses a variety of ESI, including e-mail, instant messages,
84
text messages, chat rooms, and web pages.
79. See, e.g., State v. Bellikka, 490 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992)
(establishing that a chain of custody is required for common items such as
controlled substances and bodily fluids).
80. State v. Hager, 325 N.W.2d 43, 44 (Minn. 1982) (quoting M. Graham,
Evidence and Trial Advocacy Workshop: Relevance and Exclusion of Relevant Evidence—
Real Evidence, 18 CRIM. L. BULL. 241, 243–47 (1982)).
81. Id.
82. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(1).
83. See id.
84. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 554–56 (D. Md. 2007);
United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 40 n.2 (D.D.C. 2006) (holding that
authentication of e-mail may occur by a witness with personal knowledge of email); United States v. Tank, 200 F.3d 627, 630–31 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that
authentication of chat rooms may occur by a person who participated in the chat
room, can identify chat room users, and can testify that the chat room log is an
accurate representation). For a web page, the party could offer a witness who
visited the website at a particular URL address—whether it be a website
administrator or third party—reviewed its content and testified that the printout
or other exhibit accurately reflected what was at the URL address. Accord St.
Luke’s Cataract & Laser Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, No. 8:06-CV-223-T-MSS, 2006 WL
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(3) Comparison by Trier or Expert Witness. Comparison by
the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens that
85
have been authenticated.
Authentication may occur via comparison by the factfinder or
86
Such a
expert witness with previously authenticated examples.
comparison by the fact finder, however, is subject to limitations
87
recognized by the rule drafters. Clearly, the more sophisticated
the evidence is or the more specialized knowledge is needed to
interpret it, the less likely jurors will be allowed to authenticate
such evidence. This may implicate certain types of ESI, such as
technical computer data or metadata that may require analysis by
expert witnesses. On the other hand, more common and easily
identified forms of ESI, such as e-mail, can be authenticated under
88
this Rule by jurors.
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. Appearance,
contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive
89
characteristics, taken in conjunction with circumstances.
The presence of distinctive characteristics, including
circumstantial evidence, that show that the evidence is what it
purports to be provides sufficient authentication under Minnesota
90
Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4). Circumstantial proof of authenticity
has long been recognized as an acceptable method of
1320242, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. May 12, 2006) (requiring testimony from person with
personal knowledge of a website, such as a webmaster, to authenticate printouts
from a website); Telewizja Polska USA, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite Corp., No. 02 C
3293, 2004 WL 2367740, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 2004) (finding that an Internet
archive is a form of evidence). Other courts, however, appear to require more
stringent standards for website authentication. See United States v. Jackson, 208
F.3d 633, 638 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no authentication of website postings
because proponent needed to show that website postings were actually posted by
particular group and not proponent herself), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 973 (2000).
85. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(3).
86. Id. at committee’s cmt. (1977) (“The practice of allowing jurors to
determine the authenticity of a writing has been approved in Minnesota.”) (citing
State v. Houston, 278 Minn. 41, 44, 153 N.W.2d 267, 269 (1967)).
87. Id. (“The rule should not be read as a statement that jurors can
authenticate other matters by comparison techniques without the benefit of
expert testimony, e.g., ballistics or fingerprints. These questions must be resolved
on a case by case basis.”).
88. See Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 40 (allowing jurors to compare e-mails
with authenticated e-mails from same purported sender in order to authenticate
them under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(3)).
89. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
90. Id. at committee’s cmt. (1977) (“This illustration indicates that an offer of
evidence can be authenticated by circumstantial evidence.”).
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91

authentication.
For example, letters, telegrams, and telephone
conversations were commonly authenticated by the “reply
92
doctrine.” The reply doctrine recognizes that distinctive content
or substance in a communication can demonstrate the source,
93
author, or other authenticity. This same doctrine can apply to e94
mail, text, and instant messages with the recipient’s use of the
reply function. Other distinct characteristics of e-mail that may
provide sufficient circumstantial evidence include the sender’s email address and contents of the e-mail that may reveal details only
95
known to the sender and the person receiving the message.
These “distinctive characteristics,” however, are still subject to the
risk that someone other than the named sender sent the message.
Thus, a court may still require a witness with personal knowledge
under Rule 901(b)(1) to attest to the accuracy of the contents or
other information related to the message, such as its transmission
96
date or time.
Another method for authentication under Rule 901(b)(4) for
97
A hash value is “[a] unique
ESI is the use of hash values.
91. Id. But see Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int’l Typeface Corp., 43 F.3d 443, 449
(9th Cir. 1994).
92. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(4) committee’s cmt. (1977); Merchants’ Nat’l Bank
v. State Bank of Worthington, 172 Minn. 24, 30, 214 N.W. 750, 753 (1927)
(concluding telephone conversation authenticated that affirmed previous
agreement kate – I’m not sure what this parenthetical is trying to say); Halstead v.
Minn. Tribune Co., 147 Minn. 294, 297–99, 180 N.W. 556, 557–58 (1920)
(determining reply telegraph authenticated same comment); Hoxsie v. Empire
Lumber Co., 41 Minn. 548, 550, 43 N.W. 476, 477 (1889) (determining reply letter
authenticated same).
93. 11 PETER N. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES: EVIDENCE § 901.05
(3d ed. 2001).
94. An in-depth analysis of authentication of instant messages has been
addressed elsewhere. See e.g., Andrew M. Grossman, No, Don’t IM Me—Instant
Messaging Authentication, and the Best Evidence Rule, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1309
(2006).
95. See, e.g., United States v. Siddiqui, 235 F.3d 1318, 1322–23 (11th Cir.
2000); United States v. Safavian, 435 F. Supp. 2d 36, 39–41 (D.D.C. 2006). Instant
messages have also been authenticated under rules similar to 901(b)(4). In re F.P.,
878 A.2d 91, 94 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
96. WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, supra note 72, § 900.73[3][c].
97. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 546–47 (D. Md. 2007)
(“Hash values can be inserted into original electronic documents when they are
created to provide them with distinctive characteristics that will permit their
authentication under [Fed.] Rule 901(b)(4).”). See also Federal Evidence Review,
Using
“Hash”
Values
in
Handling
Electronic
Evidence,
http://federalevidence.com/blog/2008/september/using%E2%80%9Chash%E2%80%9D-values-handling-electronic-evidence (Sept. 18,
2008) (discussing additional uses for hash values for electronic evidence during
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numerical identifier that can be assigned to a file, a group of files,
or a portion of a file, based on a standard mathematical algorithm
98
applied to the characteristics of the data set.” The likelihood of
data sets having the same hash values “is less than one in a
99
Thus, the hash value “is used to guarantee the
billion.”
authenticity of an original data set and can be used as a digital
equivalent of the Bates stamp used in paper document
100
production.”
Therefore, one can fairly determine that a copy of
an electronic file has not been altered if its hash value is identical
to the hash value of the original.
Metadata may also provide sufficient distinctive characteristics
for authentication of electronic information under Rule
101
Metadata is essentially data about data, which
901(b)(4).
“describes how, when, and by whom the data set or document was
collected, created, accessed, or modified; its size; and how it is
102
Although this type of information is useful for
formatted.”
attempting authentication under Rule 901(b)(4), it does not
appear to have the same accuracy as hash values and may require
additional authentication methods such as witnesses with personal
103
knowledge or expert testimony.
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or
system used to produce a result and showing that the
104
process or system produces an accurate result.
This illustration in the Rule’s commentary is the only one
specifically contemplating computer-related evidence in the
Minnesota Rules:
The admissibility of evidence based on X-rays, computer
printouts, voice-prints, public opinion polls, etc., all
depend upon a showing that the process or system used
does produce an accurate result. The degree of accuracy
required might vary with the purposes for which the
evidence is being offered, the state of the art, and the type
litigation).
98. BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING DISCOVERY OF
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION: A POCKET GUIDE FOR JUDGES 24 (2007).
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Lorraine, 241 F.R.D. at 547.
102. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 98, at 24–25.
103. See Fennell v. First Step Designs, Ltd., 83 F.3d 526, 530 (1st Cir. 1996)
(noting that metadata may be changed by saving electronic files in different
locations).
104. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
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105

of method or process involved.
Rule 901(b)(9) may be useful for ESI resulting from a
computer program designed to produce a result, i.e., computergenerated information, as opposed to information or data that is
106
Thus, computational software,
simply stored on a computer.
graphs, tables, animations, and spreadsheets could all fall into this
authentication category. Although no Minnesota courts have
addressed any specific requirements for Rule 901(b)(9), a party
would be well advised to be able to show, at a minimum, that the
computer process or system at issue is reliable and provides
accurate results, explain the procedure or protocol for providing
data to the computer process or system, and show that such
procedure or protocol was followed in the producing the results at
107
issue.
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any method of
authentication or identification provided by Legislative
Act or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
108
pursuant to statutory authority.
This rule was “intended to make it clear that rule 901 does not
109
For example,
limit or supersede other forms of authentication.”
110
Minnesota passed the Electronic Authentication Act in 1997.
The Act provides for the authentication of certified digital
signatures, although the Act is still subject to court evidentiary
111
requirements.
105. Id. at committee’s cmt. (1977).
106. Information that is simply stored in electronic form may be adequately
authenticated under Minnesota Rule 901(b)(1).
“In general, electronic
documents are records that are merely stored on a computer and raise no
computer-specific authentication issues.” JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 900.06[3] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed.,
Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997).
107. A far more demanding showing, consisting of an eleven-step test, has
been delineated by the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Panel for authentication under
Federal Rule 901(b)(9). See In re Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 446 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2005).
108. MINN. R. EVID. 901(b)(10).
109. Id. at committee’s cmt. (1977).
110. MINN. STAT. §§ 325K.01–.28 (2008).
111. The defined purposes of the Act are to facilitate commerce by means of
reliable electronic messages, minimize the incidence of forged digital signatures
and fraud in electronic commerce, implement international standards created to
ensure reliability and authenticity of electronic messages, and establish uniform
rules with other states in this area. § 325K.02. The Act, however, specifically
acknowledges that it does not supersede court rules “governing the use of
electronic messages and documents.” Id. § 325K.27.
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Self-Authentication Under Rule 902

In addition to the authentication methods illustrated under
Rule 901, Rule 902 provides for self-authentication methods that do
not need the extrinsic evidence of a witness providing foundational
112
testimony. In other words, Rule 902 simply obviates the need for
preliminary authentication by the proponent but does not
113
preclude other evidentiary challenges.
Two 902 rules stand out
as being potentially applicable to ESI.
(5) Official Publications. Books, pamphlets, or other
114
publications purporting to be issued by public authority.
The identification of “publications” under this rule may apply
115
to the website of a public authority, such as the government.
Some courts, however, still find websites, even from public
authorities, inherently suspect given the potential for third parties
116
Nonetheless, given
to infiltrate such sites and alter the content.
the increasing number of government agencies with websites and
the posting of official publications on their websites, Rule 902(5)
will likely be increasingly offered as a basis for authentication.
Elsewhere, courts have found printed government websites to be
112. As a result, any challenge to such evidence is relevant only to the weight,
and not admissibility, of the evidence. The admissibility, however, may still be
challenged under other exclusionary rules such as Rules 402, 403, 501, 702, 802,
or 1002. THOMPSON & HERR, supra note 12, at 279.
113. As noted by Minnesota courts, “[s]elf-authenticating, however, does not
mean that no authentication is required.” State v. Northway, 588 N.W.2d 180, 182
(Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
114. MINN. R. EVID. 902(5).
115. See, e.g., U.S. E.E.O.C. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., No. Civ.A. 031605, 2004 WL 2347556 (E.D. La. Oct. 18, 2004) (finding webpage printouts from
the U.S. Census Bureau website self-authenticating under FED. R. EVID. 902(5));
Sannes v. Jeff Wyler Chevrolet, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21748, at *10 n.3 (S.D.
Ohio, Mar. 31, 1999) (holding FTC press releases from FTC website were selfauthenticating official publications under FED. R. EVID. 902(5)).
116. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Johnny’s Oyster & Shrimp, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 773,
744, 775 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding information about boat’s ownership from U.S.
Coast Guard Vessel Database website inadmissible because Internet information
was “inherently untrustworthy” due to possibility of hackers); State v. Davis, 10
P.3d 977, 1010 (Wash. 2000) (rejecting state population statistics from official state
website because “an unauthenticated printout obtained from the Internet does
not . . . qualify as a self-authenticating document” under Washington’s
counterpart Rule 902(e)). Even Minnesota courts have required some type of
additional authenticating testimony from “self-authenticating” documents. See
Northway, 588 N.W.2d at 182 (price report from U.S. Department of Agriculture
was not authenticated absent testimony from an authorized person, seal,
certificate, or other indication of genuineness).
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self-authenticating if the offering party can show specific
117
identifying information for the website.
(7) Trade inscriptions and the like. Inscriptions, signs, tags,
or labels purporting to have been affixed in the course of
business and indicating ownership, control, or origin.
The rule commentary acknowledges that this rule is “based on
118
the unlikelihood of forgery of a trade inscription.” As applied to
ESI, this rule could provide authentication for an e-mail containing
a tag identifying the company-employer and the origin of the e119
Many business e-mails include signature blocks, provide
mail.
such information as the sender’s name, company, job title, physical
address, telephone number, and e-mail address. Of course,
authentication of e-mails under Rule 902(7) are subject to the same
problems as authentication of e-mails under Rule 901(b)(4)
because the e-mail may have been sent from someone other than
the identified sender. In that event, a party may still be required to
authenticate the e-mail by a witness with personal knowledge under
Rule 901(b)(1).
G. Shortcuts to Authentication of ESI
In searching for the least burdensome, but most reliable,
method of authenticating ESI, parties should not forget other
methods available to them under the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure. Much of the authentication gymnastics for ESI, as well
as for any other types of evidence, can be avoided by judicious use
120
For example, Rule
of available pretrial and discovery rules.
117. Williams v. Long, 585 F. Supp. 2d 679, 689 (D. Md. 2008) (“A proponent
of ESI could use the URL, date, and/or official title on a printed webpage to show
that the information was from a public authority’s website, and therefore, selfauthenticating.
Similarly, the public authority’s selection of the posted
information for publication on its website will act as the necessary ‘seal of
approval’ needed to establish that the information came from a public authority
for purposes of [Federal] Rule 902(5).”).
118. MINN. R. EVID. 902(7) committee’s cmt. (1989).
119. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 900.07[3][c][i] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1997)
(noting that an e-mail signature block “alone may be sufficient to authenticate an
e-mail under Rule 902(7)”). See also Superhighway Consulting, Inc. v. Techwave,
Inc., No. 98 CV 5502, 1999 WL 1044870, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999)
(authenticating e-mail based on signature block, among other factors).
120. Indeed, the writers of the Manual for Complex Litigation recommend that
“[i]ssues concerning accuracy and reliability of computerized evidence, including
any necessary discovery, should be addressed during pretrial proceedings and not
raised for the first time at trial.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 8, §
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16.03(c) specifically contemplates obtaining stipulations regarding
the authenticity of documents as well as seeking advance rulings on
121
Alternatively, a party could use
the admissibility of evidence.
requests to admit the authenticity of particular documents,
122
Finally, some courts have
including ESI, under Rule 36.01.
found that a party who produces ESI during discovery implicitly
admits its authenticity by doing so and is thus barred from later
objecting to its admission by the opposing party on authentication
123
grounds.
H. Electronic Evidence for Illustrative Purposes
Some “evidence” is not really substantive, but is allowed to be
124
considered by the fact-finder as “illustrative.”
Illustrative
evidence may be allowed, but is subject to the same limitations
whether created or stored in an electronic format or in India ink
125
It is not substantive evidence in the case—it does not
on vellum.
help a party carry a burden of proof and is not considered in
reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support a claim. An
illustrative exhibit that is misleading or not fairly produced can be
126
excluded, usually under Rule 403.
The presentation of evidence may be objectionable even if the
exhibit itself is otherwise admissible. For example, in a failure-todiagnose medical malpractice case, the x-rays of the patient would
invariably be admissible. But the court might very well exclude
127
This result would
magnified portions of those x-ray films.
21.446.
121. MINN. R. CIV. P. 16.03(c).
122. MINN. R. CIV. P. 36.01.
123. See Sprinkle v. Lowe’s Home Centers, Inc., No. 04-CV-4116-JPG, 2006 WL
2038580, at *2 (S.D. Ill. July 19, 2006); Superhighway Consulting, Inc., 1999 WL
1044870, at *4–5; and Indianapolis Minority Contractors Ass’n, Inc. v. Wiley, No.
IP 94-1175-C-T/G, 1998 WL 1988826, at *6 (S.D. Ind. May 13, 1998).
124. See, e.g., Strasser v. Stabeck, 112 Minn. 90, 92, 127 N.W. 384, 385 (1910)
(holding that the admissibility of illustrative evidence is “admitted, when properly
verified, to illustrate or express the testimony of a competent witness, but [is] not
original evidence”).
125. Verification and authentication of such evidence may be made by having
a knowledgeable witness testify that the exhibit is a substantially correct
representation of what that witness independently observed. MINN. R. EVID.
901(b)(1).
126. See, e.g., Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. 92-3404, 1994 WL
124857 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) (excluding computerized accident reconstruction
due to a distorted data presentation).
127. See, e.g., Rodd v. Raritan Radiologic Assocs., P.A., 860 A.2d 1003 (N.J.
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presumably be reached regardless of whether the x-rays were digital
images stored in a computer or traditional films stored in manila
sleeves with the patient’s chart.
V. HOW WILL MINNESOTA COURTS TREAT
ADMISSIBILITY OF ESI?
Given the court’s considerable discretion to admit evidence
and the variety of authentication methods available under the
Minnesota Rules of Evidence, courts have not been inclined to
deviate from the existing rules of evidence for authenticating
128
Over
evidence that involves computers or electronic technology.
eighty years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized the
ability of basic evidentiary rules to evolve and apply to future
technologies:
It may be one of those things with respect to which the
common law of evidence should demonstrate its ability to
adapt its concepts of admissibility to the current and
universal practices of business. The need will remain
however to bring forward the best evidence which the case
sensibly permits. That done, the writing should be
admitted if from the evidence there can be drawn the
129
necessary inference of authorship.
Not only should traditional evidentiary rules apply equally to future
technologies, but the discretion and common sense of the court
similarly provides a mechanism for dealing with new technologies

Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (excluding x-rays that were enlarged 30 to 150 times
and projected on a six by eight-foot screen, showing detail not discernable on
original x-rays). The result in this case might well have been the opposite if the
150-times enlargement was shown to be the standard medical practice for reading
these films.
128. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 739 N.W.2d 716, 723 (Minn. 2007)
(authenticating digital photographs). See also In re Vinhnee, 336 B.R. 437, 444
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“Authenticating a paperless electronic record, in principle,
poses the same issue as for a paper record, the only difference being the format in
which the record is maintained . . . .”); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra
note 8, § 11.446 (“In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to
computerized data as they do to other types of evidence.”). Vinhnee has been
viewed as establishing a stricter standard for admission of electronic evidence. See,
e.g., Cooper Offenbecher, Admitting Computer Record Evidence After In re Vinhnee: A
Stricter Standard for the Future?, 4 SHIDLER J. L. COM. & TECH. 6 (2007). However,
this stricter standard appears not to have been widely followed. Id.
129. Lundgren v. Union Indem. Co., 171 Minn. 122, 125, 213 N.W. 553, 555
(1927).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol35/iss4/2

26

Sugisaka and Herr: Admissibility of E-evidence in Minnesota: New Problems or Evidenc

2009]

ADMISSIBILITY OF E-EVIDENCE

1479

130

under “old” rules. In addition, courts should continue to rely on
the parties to make challenges to proffered evidence and point out
potential pitfalls and inadequacies to authentication of current
131
technologies.
The starting point—and often the end point—of the analysis
should often be to ignore the format of the proffered evidence. If
it is admissible in a nineteenth-century format, it probably should
be admitted in the twenty-first century, at least in the absence of a
serious challenge to its authenticity. Because of the potential for
electronic records to be manipulated, however, courts should be
open to considering good faith challenges to the authenticity of
evidence, and hold proponents of questionable evidence to their
burdens of establishing admissibility.

130. See Johnson v. Burmeister, 182 Minn. 385, 387, 234 N.W. 590, 591 (1931)
(“The discretion of the trial judge as to how much and what foundation to require
for the introduction of documentary evidence is not so limited as to prevent his
exercise of common sense.”).
131. See State v. Hagar, 325 N.W.2d 43, 44–45 (Minn.1982) (“If, upon
consideration of the evidence as a whole, the court determines that the evidence is
sufficient to support a finding by a reasonable juror that the matter in question is
what its proponent claims, the evidence will be admitted. The party against whom
the evidence has been received may . . . offer contradictory evidence . . . or
challenge the credibility of the supporting proof . . . . The trier of fact renders the
ultimate decision as to whether the item of real evidence . . . is as it is purported to
be.”).
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